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The activities in Brussels of the local and regional
authorities from European Free Trade Area countries
Carlo Panara
Centre for the Study of Law in Theory and Practice, Liverpool John Moores University,
Liverpool, UK
ABSTRACT
This study analyses the activities of the local and regional authorities (LRAs) from
EFTA countries in Brussels. It generates new and up-to-date knowledge on the
mobilization in the EU by LRAs from EFTA countries; it enriches the literature on
multi-level governance in the EU, so far mostly confined to the mobilization of
LRAs from EU countries; and it contributes to the debate on lobbying in the EU
by third-country actors. This research identifies three scenarios of engagement
with the EU institutions: the first in which the Brussels offices predominantly
engage in information-gathering and networking/liaison activities; the second
in which the LRAs also engage in lobbying the EU; and the Swiss Cantons, that
are fully integrated in the Swiss Mission to the EU.
KEYWORDS EFTA; Swiss Cantons; Norwegian regions; Icelandic local authorities; engagement with the EU
Introduction
Past research found that the main activities in Brussels of local and regional
authorities (LRAs) from EU countries concern information-gathering, network-
ing, liaising between the region and the EU, chasing funding and influencing
policy. LRAs with primary legislative powers typically engage in lobbying of
the EU institutions to influence policy, whereas LRAs without such powers
tend to do so to a far lesser extent (Marks, Haesly, and Mbaye 2002; Callanan
and Tatham 2014; Tatham 2017, 2018). How can we situate the LRAs from the
European Free Trade Area (EFTA) according to this existing knowledge?
As well as contributing knowledge on a still largely unexplored aspect of
LRAs’ mobilization in the EU in relation to EFTA countries, this study enriches
the literature on multi-level governance in the EU, so far predominantly
confined to the mobilization of LRAs from EU member states (Hooghe and
Marks 2001; Piattoni 2010; Panara and De Becker 2011; Rowe 2011;
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Stephenson 2013; Panara 2015; Tatham 2016; Pazos-Vidal 2019). By shedding
light on lobbying by non-EU LRAs from EFTA countries, it also contributes to
the debate on lobbying in the EU by third country actors (Gullberg 2015;
Korkea-Aho 2016), as well as to the debate on lobbying by the regions in
the EU (Tatham 2019).
This study focuses on EFTA countries as a cohesive group of countries that
are in a similar position vis-à-vis the EU. All four EFTA countries (Iceland, Liech-
tenstein, Norway and Switzerland) have a close alignment with the EU single
market, although there are differences between Switzerland and the others as
to the mechanisms for ensuring that alignment.
No previous study has looked holistically at LRAs from EFTA countries. This
contribution presents new empirical and up-to-date data on the Brussels
offices of Norwegian LRAs, the Brussels representation of the Conference of
Swiss Cantonal Governments and the Brussels representation of the Icelandic
Association of Local Authorities. A rather outdated article (Baldersheim and
Fimreite 2005) and a more recent master’s thesis (Realfsen 2015), both in
English, discuss the Norwegian LRAs’ engagement with the EU, but they
are not reflective of the current situation. There is abundant literature in
German on the influence of the Swiss Cantons on the European policy of Swit-
zerland and on the implementation in that country of legislation emanating
from the EU (Jaag 2009), however this study supplies new and up-to-date
data on the activities of the Swiss Cantons in Brussels. There is no literature
in English on the Icelandic Association of Local Authorities.
The LRAs from EFTA countries are an important case study in the context
of non-EU LRAs in Brussels. EFTA countries have a total population of over 14
million people and, with an overall nominal GDP of around $1.2 trillion
(which, together, would place them among the top 15 countries globally
by nominal GDP in 2019) are among the most advanced economies in the
world, as well as among the most important trading partners of the EU (cur-
rently Switzerland being the third, Norway the 6th and Iceland the 52nd;
European Parliament 2019). The exit of the UK from the EU at the end of
2020 adds significance to this study, in that a number of LRAs from the UK
that currently operate Brussels-based offices might soon be in a position
similar to LRAs from third countries and might need to continue to seek pol-
itical influence in Brussels (HoL EU Select Committee 2019, 30-31).
This research note analyses the LRAs from three of the four current EFTA
countries – Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. The study does not include
Liechtenstein, since the small size of this country implies that there is no sub-
stantial sub-state level of authority that deserves attention. These are three
countries that feature a considerable alignment to EU single market rules,
but that have rejected membership of, or closer alignment with, the EU.
Norway held two referendums in 1972 and 1994, respectively, on member-
ship of the European Economic Community and of the EU, both of which
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opposed joining these organizations. In 1992, a referendum held in Switzer-
land rejected membership of the European Economic Area (EEA). In 2009,
Iceland applied for EU membership, but in 2013 it withdrew its application.
Iceland and Norway, along with Liechtenstein, are members both of the
EFTA, established in 1960 (Iceland and Liechtenstein joined in 1970 and
1991 respectively), and of the EEA established through the EEA Agreement
of 1992. Unlike the other EFTA countries, Switzerland is an EFTA but not an
EEA member. EEA membership implies that most EU single market rules,
including those concerning the free movements, apply to EEA countries (Bau-
denbacher 2015, 2017), although not automatically; these countries have to
incorporate any new relevant EU legislation into their domestic legal systems.
This study is based on five semi-structured interviews conducted between
June and September 2019 with Brussels-based representatives of the Icelan-
dic Association of Local Authorities, the Conference of Swiss Cantonal Gov-
ernments and of three of the six Brussels offices of the Norwegian LRAs
(North Norway, South Norway, Mid-Norway). Three offices (Oslo, Stavanger
and West-Norway) did not take part in this study, but the sample used for
this study is significant both numerically (half of the overall target group)
and qualitatively, in that the study captures the main trends and types and
in particular the divide in Norway between offices that engage or do not
engage in lobbying the EU institutions, where by ‘lobbying’ I mean attempts
to influence the EU’s decision-making process in favour of one region (Jeffery
1996, 192; Marks, Haesly and Mbaye 2002, 6; Tatham 2017, 1090).
Description of the Case Studies and Relevant Background
Information on Them
Norway features a three-level dynamic between the central state (and the
extended role of the state through various types of bodies); the counties
and a large number of municipalities. The counties do not have primary leg-
islative competences, but have significant administrative responsibilities that
they exercise through directly elected political representatives. A number of
areas falling within the remit of the EU are of high interest to Norwegian LRAs,
such as, the maritime agenda, the regulations concerning food processing
industries and the rules on state aid, given that a number of Norwegian
local authorities grant forms of tax relief to local companies and this practice
may clash with those rules.
The South Norway region is a small region with c.ca 300,000 inhabitants.
The Office was first established in 2005, but it exists in its current form
since 2008. There are currently seven staff working for the Office. Three are
based in Brussels, three in South Norway and one is currently temporarily
working on a project in Luxembourg. The Office is a not-for-profit company
owned by two counties which are, however, about to merge into one
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county (Agder). These two counties own 70 per cent of the shares while a
local city and a town own the rest. This arrangement is unique in Norway
in that the Office is entirely publicly funded, whereas the other European
offices adopt a membership model that involves public and private actors.
The Office is therefore a public sector body that is subjected to the same
laws on transparency and objectivity that apply to the civil service. Regional
stakeholders directly or indirectly benefiting from the activities of the Office
include regional research centres and universities, the industry sector and the
blue economy sector. The work of the Office concerns, broadly speaking, all
the opportunities arising for South Norway from the EFTA-EEA. It is therefore
a wide-ranging mandate that leaves the Office considerable leeway for
manoeuvre (Greenwood 2011).
The Mid-Norway Office exists since 2001. It is organized as an association
owned by a number of members, currently 11. The most important is Trønde-
lag County Authority, that holds close to half of the total votes within the
Office Board. Trøndelag County Authority is also the most important funder
of the Office and it is the employer of staff working at the Office. Other
members include local authorities, a local university (Nord University) and
private sector organizations, including a bank. All members contribute
funding to the Office’s budget. Currently there are five staff working at the
Office – two full-time and three part-time.
The North Norway Brussels Office is owned by three counties (Nordland,
Troms and Finnmark) which contribute three-quarter of the budget. There
are also other partners which, together, contribute one-quarter of the
overall funding. These are two universities (Nord Universiteit and UiT, the
Arctic University of Norway), a municipality (Tromsø), two regional councils
(Helgeland and Salten, which are informal cooperation forums between
neighbouring municipalities), the Norwegian Fishermen’s Sales Organization
and the Region Innovation Council. In the past the Office also partnered with
local business organizations, but this is currently not the case apart from the
Fishermen’s Sales Organization.
The Office was first established in 2003 by Nordland County and since 2005
it has existed as the office of three counties and has been further expanded
with a number of partners joining since 2005. The Office is registered as a lob-
bying organization and operates as an advocate in Brussels on behalf of North
Norway. The North Norway Office is at present the only regional office from
Norway engaging in lobbying of the EU institutions, although also the Mid-
Norway Office is currently planning to undertake such activity in the future.
From September 2019 the Office has three full-time permanent employees
and two fixed-term trainees.
Iceland has a two-tier system of government with the state and the muni-
cipalities which have administrative responsibilities but no legislative powers.
The key areas of intersection between the responsibilities of the Icelandic
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municipalities and the EU include: EU environment and particularly waste
legislation; EU labour and employment law, that are relevant to municipal
employees; services legislation, given that the municipalities purchase and
provide services (e.g. healthcare and education); and finally, since the Icelan-
dic municipalities own companies (e.g. energy companies), EU rules appli-
cable to these economic activities.
The Icelandic municipalities’ Brussels Office employs one full-time member
of staff. The Office is also supported by two Reykjavik-based staff. The Office is
part of the Icelandic Association of Local Authorities, of which all the Icelandic
municipalities are members, and is entirely funded by them. It was estab-
lished in 2006; prior to that time the Icelandic municipalities used to delegate
a representative to attend relevant meetings in Brussels, but this representa-
tive was not permanently based in Brussels.
EEA members have to take onboard the overwhelming majority of the new
EU acquis – 80–90 per cent of the EU laws are implemented in these countries.
Switzerland, by contrast, is in a sui generis position. It has concluded a series of
bilateral agreements (approximatively 100) with the EU. The Cantons, which
are the constitutive parts of the Swiss Confederation, have been associated
by the Federal Government in the negotiations of these agreements. Article
55 of the Federal Constitution of 1999 (a legal provision which was introduced
to this purpose), gives the Cantons the right to participate in the negotiation
of bilateral agreements that encroach upon their responsibilities (e.g. police
cooperation, tax matters, education, road constructions, hospitals etc.) or
that affect their vital interests. The Conference of Cantonal Governments
was established in 1993 to rationalize the participation of the 26 Cantons in
external affairs. It coordinates the positions of the Cantonal Governments
vis-à-vis the Federal Government in relation to EU matters but also, more in
general, in relation to matters concerning international trade.
The representative of the Cantons at the Mission of Switzerland to the EU is
in place as a full-time post since 2002. Prior to 2002 there was a part-time
representative. The representative reports to the Secretariat of the Confer-
ence of Cantonal Governments. He is supported by an assistant that he
shares with the Mission of Switzerland to the EU and works closely with col-
leagues from various federal ministries with relevant responsibilities – a pro-
minent example is the Ministry of Justice, due to the fact that Switzerland is
part of the Schengen Area.
The remit of the representative is not confined to the EU, although most of
his activities concern the EU. It includes, for example, also free trade agree-
ments concluded by the EFTA with countries around the world if these
trade deals have an impact on the responsibilities or interests of the Cantons.
The following three scenarios emerge from the analysis of these offices
and of the representative of the Swiss Cantons: the funding, information
gathering, liaison, building ties scenario (South Norway, Mid-Norway and
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Icelandic municipalities); the soft lobbying on specific issues scenario (North
Norway); and the fully integrated, diplomatically accredited federal sub-unit
with legislative powers scenario (Swiss Cantons).
Scenario 1 – funding, Information-gathering, Liaison and Building
Ties: South Norway; Mid-Norway; Icelandic Association of Local
Authorities
The remit of these three offices includes a number of activities, such as, facil-
itating the participation by local stakeholders in funding programmes; gath-
ering information concerning new EU legislation and policies; liaising with
the EU institutions; and building ties with local authorities from other Euro-
pean countries. Their remit does not include lobbying the EU institutions,
although the Mid-Norway Office is currently planning to develop lobbying
in the future. Through their Offices, South Norway and Mid-Norway learn
about new developments in the EU. These do not include only policy
changes, but also the identification of best practice across Europe as far as
the implementation of policies is concerned; for example, the municipality
of Ljubljana (Slovenia) is the leader in relation to waste management and
South Norway’s authorities have learned from it. The South Norway Office
created an online platform for regional stakeholders which aggregates a
number of examples of best practice and know-how from across the EU
and publishes strategic briefings for the community.
The South Norway and Mid-Norway Offices, as well as the Office of Icelan-
dic Association of Local Authorities, promote awareness among local stake-
holders of the opportunities that arise from the relationship with the EU; in
particular, funding opportunities, such as Horizon 2020, Creative Europe,
Erasmus+, Norway and EEA grants. The South Norway Office organizes
group visits of stakeholders from South Norway to Brussels to learn about
the EU and opportunities available to the region. The Mid-Norway Office pro-
duced a position paper concerning the Creative Europe 2021–2027 proposal
which was incorporated into a white paper of the Norwegian government
that outlined the relevance of the programme to regional actors from
Norway. Mid-Norway Office and Icelandic Association of Local Authorities
are particularly active in supporting universities and research groups in creat-
ing the networks and consortia for Horizon 2020. Currently the Mid-Norway
Office is the secretariat to a project with stakeholders from Mid-Norway
that aims to promote more Horizon 2020 applications.
The offices of the Norwegian regions in Brussels promote the image of the
respective regions. The South Norway and the Mid-Norway Offices promote
knowledge of the good practice, technological solutions and creations
from these regions (e.g. through the organization of conferences). For
example, South Norway has developed very advanced technology in the
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field of e-health which the Office shares with relevant organizations. Mid-
Norway showcased certain high-speed boats invented to sail in the Norwe-
gian fjords during the European Days organized by the Office in partnership
with the Norwegian delegation to the EU. Both Offices see Brussels not only
as the headquarters of the EU, but also as a hub to liaise and network with
other regions and the companies from those regions.
South Norway and Mid-Norway participate in the European Regions
Research & Innovation Network (ERRIN). Since 2010 South Norway has
been a member of ERRIN and a representative from the Office currently sits
on the Board of this organization. This is an important forum to acquire
know-how, as well as for the purpose of building consortia for funding appli-
cations and collaborative projects. For example, through ERRIN South Norway
developed a partnership with the LRAs from North Netherlands due to their
geographical proximity and common interests with Norway. The Mid-Norway
Office, which is planning to engage in lobbying in the future, sees the net-
working activity of the Office as conducive to possible future alliances with
LRAs from EU member states for joint lobbying purposes.
The South Norway Office is the only office that helps its regional stake-
holders to write their funding applications for EEA grants, an activity that
requires considerable technical expertise. In addition to EEA grants, there
are the Interreg programmes (all of which depend on interregional collabor-
ations), some of which are available to Norway. These programmes are par-
ticularly popular in Norway due to the higher success rate compared to
other programmes, such as, Horizon 2020. South Norway currently partici-
pates in the programmes concerning the North Sea and the Baltic Sea, as
well as the programme concerning the Atlantic and the Norway-Sweden part-
nership. Annually, the Office brings back to the region, in terms of European
grants, 2.5 times what is invested in the Office by the LRAs. To this figure, the
South Norway Office pointed out, one has to add less quantifiable benefits,
such as, the advantage to the regional economy generated through the infor-
mation that the Office supplies to the region and its economic players.
The position of the Brussels Office of Icelandic Association of Local Auth-
orities is not substantially different to South Norway andMid-Norway. Its prin-
cipal task is observing legislative developments in the EU. This includes
collecting information about legislation that is in the pipeline, as well as
keeping up to speed with legislation that has been approved recently. The
Office also delivers impact analyses on how the novel legislation is expected
to impact on these authorities.
Influencing the EU institutions through lobbying, which is one of the
primary tasks of a number of Brussels offices of the LRAs from the EU
member states, is quite problematic for Icelandic municipalities. This is
because Iceland is not a member state and is a small country with little lever-
age. Accordingly, building coalitions and alliances with LRAs from other
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countries is crucial for Icelandic municipalities – with LRAs from other EFTA
countries, but also, due to their similar economic interests, from other
North European countries, such as, The Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark.
Since some of these countries are in the EU, these coalitions add strength
to the influence of Icelandic municipalities on the EU institutions. Member-
ship of European networks, such as, the Council of European Municipalities
and Eurocities (of which Reykjavik is a member), is therefore crucial for the
Icelandic municipalities.
The Committee of the Regions too is of some importance to the Icelandic
municipalities. Although these are not among its members, it is quite impor-
tant to have contacts with this EU body and especially with LRAs that are part
of it, because, even though the Committee’s opinions are only advisory, these
opinions are taken into account by the institutions in the legislative process
(Ricci 2011; Panara 2015, 137; Piattoni and Schönlau 2015). The Committee of
the Regions is useful, more in general, in order to obtain information in real
time on the laws that are relevant to the Icelandic local authorities.
Scenario 2 – soft lobbying on specific issues: North Norway
The North Norway Office does not limit itself to gathering information con-
cerning forthcoming changes to EU law and policy and the other activities
identified in relation to the first scenario. This office also tries to influence
EU law and policy through a ‘soft lobbying’ of the EU institutions; for
example, North Norway often supplies data to the Commission. The Commis-
sion welcomes this input because it has limited research facilities and usually
relatively little information about problems affecting Norway. Whilst there is
no structured cooperation with the other regional offices from Norway in this
particular field, primarily because the other offices do not engage in lobbying,
there is close cooperation and exchange of information between the Office
and the Norwegian Mission to the EU. Although there is no formal joint strat-
egy between the Norwegian Mission and North Norway, this situation does
not usually give rise to frictions because Norway’s national interest in relation
to certain themes coincides with North Norway’s.
In 2008, the EU initiated the development of the EU Arctic policy (Holdhus
2010). This is of particular importance to North Norway. The initial draft of the
policy focused largely on climate change and environmental protection, but
North Norway felt that, overall, it evidenced a lack of detailed knowledge
about the Arctic region. North Norway is reliant upon resources located in
the Arctic – fish, minerals, energy etc. The approach taken by the EU would
have limited a number of economic activities that are essential to North
Norway’s economy and for this reason North Norway decided to lobby the
EU institutions in order to influence this new policy. The EU Arctic policy of
2016 (European Commission and High Representative of the EU for Foreign
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Affairs and Security Policy 2016) appears more focused on sustainable devel-
opment in cooperation with the peoples living in the Arctic compared to the
initial draft. To achieve this result, North Norway lobbied the European insti-
tutions jointly with LRAs from North Finland, North Denmark and Sweden (all
EU member states), as well as organizations of Sámi people, Greenland,
Iceland, the Faroe Islands and others, which, due to their geographical
location, share similar economic interests to North Norway. Along with
North Norway, all these regions and groupings are part of the Arctic Stake-
holder Forum established by the Commission to develop the EU Arctic
policy. According to the North Norway Office, since the creation of the
Forum the Commission has been receptive of the point of view of regional
stakeholders including North Norway and has worked constructively with
the northern regions.
Another example of lobbying concerns the work that the Office does,
along with regions from North Sweden and North Finland, to raise awareness
by the EU institutions of the particular working conditions of companies from
these regions. Due to the distance from central Europe, there are extra-costs
related to transport that affect companies in North Norway when exporting
goods into the EU. Like in most districts outside the largest towns in
Norway, employers from North Norway (both from the public and the
private sector) benefit from a lower payroll tax that helps them offset this
extra-cost. This might be problematic in light of the EU rules on state aid.
North Norway has close links to a number of regions from the EU. These
relations are occasionally conducive to joint lobbying initiatives that have
the potential to enhance the influence of North Norway in EU decision-
making processes. For lobbying purposes but also, more in general, to
promote the region and its economy, the Office organizes trips to North
Norway for 12–15 MEPs at a time who can learn about the universities and
more in general the economy and society of North Norway. This is a way
to put the region on the map of EU policymakers.
Finally, although it is not within the remit of the Office to promote invest-
ment in North Norway, occasionally the Office promotes the know-how and
expertise available in the region, for example in relation to satellite services
and observation systems for surveillance or methods to tackle pollution, as
well as in relation to the blue economy and fishery sector.
The Office also engages in the same activities as the other Norwegian
offices in relation to Horizon 2020 and ERRIN.
Scenario 3 – fully Integrated, Diplomatically Accredited Federal sub-
units with Legislative Powers: Swiss Cantons
The remit of the representative of the Cantons in Brussels embraces three
areas: monitoring Swiss-EU relations affecting the responsibilities and
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interests of the Cantons; keeping up to speed with developments in the EU in
general; and networking. He does not engage in lobbying the EU institutions.
The Brussels representative is a member of the Mission of Switzerland to
the EU on an equal basis with the representatives of the Swiss Federal Admin-
istration. He participates in meetings of the Swiss Mission and has access to
documents related to topics concerning the Cantons. Sometimes he attends
meetings with the EU institutions as part of the Mission. The interests and
responsibilities of the Swiss Cantons are wide-ranging as Switzerland is a
federal state and the Cantons, even in fields where they do not have legisla-
tive power, are often responsible for the implementation of federal laws. This
implies that there is an interest of the Cantons in virtually any matter that
requires negotiation with the EU.
The Swiss Mission to the EU comprises 50 staff. This figure includes the
Head of Mission (the Ambassador), over 20 diplomats and administrative
support staff. Members of the Swiss Mission write a high number of reports
and occasionally the representative of the Cantons writes his own reports
for the Conference of Cantonal Governments or shares with his cantonal col-
leagues in Bern the reports produced by the Swiss Mission. This information
may be incorporated into documents prepared for the Conference of Canto-
nal Governments or be dispatched by the Secretariat of the Conference
directly to the cantonal administrations.
The representative of the Swiss Cantons maintains relations with regions
near Switzerland which are represented in Brussels, such as, Baden-Württem-
berg, Bavaria, Lombardy, Piedmont, Auvergne-Rhône Alpes and Bourgogne-
Franche-Comte, but also with UK devolved administrations. These network-
ing activities, however, are for good relations rather than for business pur-
poses. The Swiss Cantons do not use networking as an instrument to seek
political influence in EU decision-making, but as a way to obtain information
on EU policy. This lack of lobbying by the Canton representative is due to his
full inclusion in the domestic process to shape Switzerland’s position on EU
affairs. Being fully integrated domestically and in Brussels (through diplo-
matic accreditation), there is little need to carry individual lobbying in
Brussels.
The representative of the Cantons attends the meetings of the Committee
of the Regions as a member of the general public, when these concern topics
relevant to the Swiss Cantons, such as, public services or subsidiarity. Some
Cantons participate in the EU’s Interreg programme and some are present
in Strasbourg and take part in the activities of the Congress of Local and
Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe. The Conference of Cantonal
Governments represents the Swiss Cantons in the EEA-EFTA Forum of Local
and Regional Authorities. This is a body with an advisory role similar to the
Committee of the Regions in the EU. The Conference of Cantonal Govern-
ments has observer status in the Forum which meets twice a year. The
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Swiss Cantons were also observers in the no longer operational Conference of
European Regions with Legislative Power.
Data Analysis and Concluding Remarks
The impact of EU legislation and policies on the EFTA countries is such that
the LRAs from these countries behave in a similar way to the LRAs from
the EU member states, which, since the 1980s, have established a multitude
of representative offices in Brussels (Rowe 2011, 7; Committee of the Regions
2017). Although some LRAs from the EFTA countries were already active in
Brussels before 2001, all the analysed offices, including the representative
of the Swiss Cantons, have been established between 2001 and 2006, prior
to the 2008 financial crisis and during a period of relative growth of the EU
integration project despite the failure of the Treaty Establishing a Consti-
tution for Europe. The 2001–2006 period came after the decision made by
some EFTA countries during the 1990s not to join the EU (Norway) or the
EEA (Switzerland), whilst Iceland’s membership negotiations began in 2009
before being eventually shelved in 2013. This sequence of events suggests
that the creation of better resourced offices in Brussels is part of the reorgan-
ization of the EFTA countries’ relationship with the EU after or in parallel to
the choice to remain out of the EU or of the EEA, while at the same time
remaining closely aligned to the EU single market.
The analysed offices are either entirely owned by LRAs (Iceland, South
Norway), or predominantly owned by LRAs but with a membership that
includes local universities and private sector organizations (Mid-Norway
and North Norway). The second type of structure is typical of a number of
Brussels-based offices of the English LRAs (Panara and Varney 2017). The
representative of the Swiss Cantons is part of the Swiss Mission to the EU.
In terms of size, if one looks at the number of Brussels-based full-time
employees only, the number of permanent full-time staff ranges from a
minimum of one and a maximum of three. The size of the offices appears
small if compared to the representations of the German Länder. For
example, the Land Baden-Württemberg operates a representation staffed
by over twenty people (Panara 2015, 135). However, that Land has more
than double the population of Norway and a higher GDP than Norway. Fur-
thermore, the German Länder are regions with legislative powers and a con-
stitutional standing that cannot be compared to the LRAs from Norway and
Iceland. These regions have the power to implement state laws including
those originally emanating from the EU but do not have primary legislative
powers. The size of EFTA LRAs’ Brussels offices is comparable to that of
most English LRAs’ European offices (Panara and Varney 2017, 5-7).
The analysed offices engage in a number of activities. The activity which is
common to all the analysed LRAs is the gathering of insights on forthcoming
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EU policy changes. This is key to the LRAs for two reasons: first, because the
new EU legislation may have an impact on local economy and public services;
second, because LRAs are responsible for the implementation of the new EU
rules in areas that fall within their remit.
Lobbying of the EU institutions to influence policy is part of the remit of
North Norway (currently the only one, among the six European offices of
the Norwegian LRAs, to engage in lobbying). There is some evidence
that LRAs see lobbying as increasingly important for non-EU LRAs from
EFTA countries. This is demonstrated by Mid-Norway’s current plans to
engage in this activity in the future while the Icelandic Association of
Local Authorities highlighted the desire, but also the difficulty for Icelandic
municipalities, to influence EU policies. The Swiss Cantons do not engage in
lobbying because they shape EU-Switzerland relations through their par-
ticipation in the negotiations of the sectoral agreements between Switzer-
land and the EU (Realfsen 2015, 41-42). The lack of engagement in lobbying
by five out of six Norwegian Brussels offices (four out of six, if Mid-Norway is
included) may depend on a number of reasons. Since all the interviewed
officials from EFTA LRAs commented on the difficulty to influence effec-
tively EU legislative processes through lobbying, this suggests that Norwe-
gian LRAs see lobbying as too time-consuming and costly, as well as
conducive to little results. Additionally, these LRAs do not have legislative
competences and are quite poorly staffed in Brussels (Marks, Haesly and
Mbaye 2002, 15-16; Callanan and Tatham 2014, 195, 198-200; Tatham
2017, 1092).
LRAs from EFTA states engage in a number of networking activities with a
range of economic and political actors from the EU. These networking activi-
ties are conducive to the exchange of information and know-how. The offices
that engage in lobbying use their networks to create alliances and coalitions
in order to enhance their political influence in the EU. This practice is similar
to that of LRAs from EU member states (Panara 2015, 151), with the
peculiarity that EFTA LRAs capitalize on the EU status of their ‘allies’, both
in terms of extracting information which would not otherwise be easily acces-
sible and in terms of increased political influence. This is significant for multi-
level governance theory in that it reveals that mobilization of sub-state actors
in the EU and coalitions are not limited to EU actors and include LRAs from
non-EU countries. Whilst there is no evidence suggesting that EU policies
are shaped decisively by EFTA LRAs, it is at least noteworthy that these
LRAs are active in building coalitions that can influence EU decisions.
It is also noteworthy that the study of the offices of EFTA LRAs revealed a
different dimension of the role of the Committee of the Regions. This advisory
body which is used by EU LRAs as a forum for discussing and influencing
policy, becomes for non-EU LRAs an opportunity to liaise with other LRAs
and obtain information.
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All the analysed offices from EFTA countries, with the exception of the
representative of the Swiss Cantons, provide support for funding opportu-
nities emanating from the EU. The support ranges from forwarding the rel-
evant information to local stakeholders to the actual assistance to
applicants from the region. This stream of activity is prominent also in relation
to European offices of LRAs from the EU (Rowe 2011, 83-125; Panara 2015,
127-154; Panara and Varney 2017). The representative of the Swiss Cantons
does not engage in this type of activity due to the particular nature of his role.
One EFTAmodel of engagement in Brussels by non-EU LRAs does not exist.
There are similarities across LRAs from EEA countries, the main divide being
between LRAs that engage in lobbying and those that do not do so. There
could be, however, an ongoing trend among LRAs from EEA-EFTA countries
towards expanding their lobbying activity, as the example of Mid-Norway
demonstrates. All in all, with the exception of lobbying the EU institutions,
the analysed offices engage in the same type of activities as the LRAs from
EU member states. This is not a surprise because the EFTA countries and
their LRAs are largely integrated into the EU single market. It is fair to say
that there is no huge difference between LRAs from the EU and those from
EFTA countries in terms of the scope of their activities in Brussels. The ana-
lysed offices lamented the difficulty to influence the EU institutions due to
the fact that they are not part of the EU and the small size of their country.
All reported that alliances with LRAs from EU member states help mitigate
these limitations.
Across the analysed offices the key difference is between the Swiss
Cantons and LRAs from other EFTA countries. When he describes the
different approach to the Brussels game by the Swiss Cantons and the Nor-
wegian regions, Realfsen (2015, 6) downplays the impact of the different con-
stitutional standing of the Swiss Cantons compared to the Norwegian LRAs.
The Swiss Cantons, though, are constitutional regions with certain consti-
tutional prerogatives (e.g. legislative and external relations powers), whilst
the LRAs from the other EFTA countries are regions with powers of implemen-
tation of state and EU laws, but do not have primary legislative powers. The
participation of the Cantons in shaping the relationship between Switzerland
and the EU is institutionalized through intra-state channels, in that the
Cantons are part of the relevant negotiations with the EU and portray their
position directly to the Federal Government during these negotiations. This
finding reflects the position of what Callanan and Tatham call ‘stronger
regions’, meaning essentially the regions with legislative powers (such as,
the Austrian Länder), that usually give priority to intra-state interest represen-
tation channels (Callanan and Tatham 2014, 195 and 202; Tatham 2017, 1093-
1094).
The reception of new EU laws in Switzerland requires bespoke agreements.
As a result, for the Swiss Cantons the real political game takes place in Bern,
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where they have the opportunity to shape the approach of the Federal Gov-
ernment to various EU policies, rather than in Brussels. The participation
mechanism created for the Cantons prevents the typical multi-level govern-
ance dynamic whereby the LRAs go to Brussels and engage in their own para-
diplomacy. The entire mechanism in place for the Swiss Cantons aims to
ensure that their voice is heard while maintaining the coherence of Swiss
external relations. This marks a difference between Switzerland and federal
states that are members of the EU, such as, Germany and Austria. The
German and the Austrian Länder enjoy participation mechanisms that
influence or, occasionally, determine the position of these member states
in the Council but, due to the automatic application of the EU legislation in
the member states, they also lobby the EU institutions through their Brus-
sels-based offices (Jeffery 1997; Eberhard 2011, 231-232; Realfsen 2015, 59-
65; Panara 2015, 135-137).
North Norway and Mid-Norway clearly have peculiar needs that encourage
them to seek direct influence in Brussels and the same seems to be true for
the Icelandic Association of Local Authorities. So, one key tenet of multi-level
governance, that is, that many sub-state actors from the EU engage directly in
the Brussels political arena, has to be re-thought or fine-tuned in light of this
finding – that also non-EU LRAs go to Brussels and participate in the political
processes. This happens because the EFTA countries and their LRAs are ulti-
mately part of the European integration process lato sensu.
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